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The main objective of this research is to identify and discuss theoretically the advances, 
limitations and perspectives pointed by international research to improve the accountability 
and evaluation aspects of PPPs. This is a theoretical essay based on the Public Choice Theory 
to show that the PPP accounting treatment is relevant to avoid lack of transparency and 
accountability, mitigating possible losses in the decision-making process and the ineffective 
allocation of public resources. The discussion of topics reveals the importance of public 
accounting in measuring the financial and social consequences that the shared responsibility 
of PPPs can have, defending the public interest and democratic relations. It is argued that 
different factors may influence PPP accounting issues, involving governance limitations, 
institutional weaknesses, widespread corruption, lack of transparency, weak regulatory 
environments, power imbalances between partners, lack of political commitment and 
trust. Finally, some accounting research questions and topics are presented that should be 
considered to prevent private interest from overriding the public interest in contracting a PPP. 
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PARCERIAS PÚBLICO-PRIVADAS: SURGIMENTO, LIMITAÇÕES E 
PERSPECTIVAS PARA A CONTABILIDADE PÚBLICA 
 
Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo central identificar e discutir sob o aspecto teórico os 
avanços, limitações e perspectivas apontados por pesquisas internacionais para melhorar a 
prestação de contas e os aspectos de avaliação das PPPs. Trata-se de um ensaio teórico, 
baseado na Teoria da Escolha Pública para evidenciar que o tratamento contábil das PPP é 
relevante para evitar a falta de transparência e responsabilização, amenizando possíveis 
prejuízos no processo de tomada de decisão e a alocação ineficaz de recursos públicos. A 
discussão dos tópicos revela a importância da contabilidade pública em mensurar as 
consequências financeiras e sociais que a responsabilidade compartilhada das PPPs pode 
causar, defendendo o interesse público e as relações democráticas. Argumenta-se que 
diferentes fatores podem influenciar questões contábeis sobre PPPs, envolvendo limitações de 
governança, fraquezas institucionais, corrupção generalizada, falta de transparência, 
ambientes regulatórios fragilizados, desequilíbrios de poder entre os parceiros, falta de 
compromisso político e de confiança. Por fim, são apresentados alguns questionamentos e 
tópicos de pesquisas contábeis que deveriam ser considerados para impedir que o interesse 
privado se sobressaia sobre o interesse público na contratação de uma PPP. 




ASOCIACIONES PÚBLICO-PRIVADAS: ORIGEN, LIMITACIONES Y 
PERSPECTIVAS PARA LA CONTABILIDAD PÚBLICA 
 
El objetivo principal de este estudio fue identificar y discutir teóricamente los avances, 
limitaciones y perspectivas señaladas por la investigación internacional para mejorar los 
aspectos de responsabilidad y evaluación de las APP. Este es un ensayo teórico basado en la 
Teoría de la elección pública para mostrar que el tratamiento contable de las APP es relevante 
para evitar la falta de transparencia y responsabilidad, mitigando las posibles pérdidas en el 
proceso de toma de decisiones y la asignación ineficaz de los recursos públicos. La discusión 
de los temas revela la importancia de la contabilidad pública en la medición de las 
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consecuencias financieras y sociales que puede tener la responsabilidad compartida de las 
APP, defendiendo el interés público y las relaciones democráticas. Se argumenta que 
diferentes factores pueden influir en los problemas de contabilidad de las APP, que incluyen 
limitaciones de gobierno, debilidades institucionales, corrupción generalizada, falta de 
transparencia, entornos regulatorios débiles, desequilibrios de poder entre los socios, falta de 
compromiso político y confianza. Finalmente, se presentan algunas preguntas y temas de 
investigación contable que deben considerarse para evitar que el interés privado anule el 
interés público en la contratación de una APP. 




INTRODUCTION              
  
Globalization makes multiple actors interact with the state and share their 
functions. This sharing does not lead to the end of the state, but rather stimulates a series of 
government and governance strategies in a more activist state (ANGELIS, 2015). The 
involvement of other actors in the public administration, either private or from the civil 
society, again emphasizes the need to conceptualize the diversity of the public sector 
(PETERS; PIERRE, 2010).  
It is in this context that more than twenty years ago the term Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) was conceptualized. From a global perspective, PPPs are viewed as an alternative form 
of financing and management to be used in addition to or complementary to other instruments 
to address infrastructure and service needs across a wide range of sectors, from environmental 
services to health or education (HODGE; GREVE, 2005). 
This topic has been developing in recent years, with increasing research seeking to 
elucidate a range of PPP-related issues, ranging from overviews to industry-specific 
approaches, revealing aspects of efficiency measurement to institutional factors that favor its 
implementation. Despite this effort, it is still necessary to reexamine the different meanings 
and definitions given to PPPs to analyze their domain and their theoretical structure 
(MARSILIO; CAPPELLARO; CUCCURULLO, 2011). 
In research agendas that address the PPP approach from an accounting perspective, 
some papers (CAPERCHIONE; DEMIRAG; GROSSI, 2017; HODGE; BOARDMAN, 
2017a) question the role that accounting should play as part of the development and adoption 
of PPP projects. In this sense, accounting needs to be part of the decision process that leads to 
the adoption of any asset delivery model, evidencing not only a clear understanding of the 
     REAd | Porto Alegre – Vol. 26 – N.º 1 – Janeiro / Abril 2020 – 114-136.  
117 
values involved in hiring, but also its limitations, origins, construction and interpretation 
(OPARA; ROUSE, 2018). 
Moreover, PPP accountability involves many technical and difficult to understand 
terms (engineering, budgetary and legal aspects) that make accountability and its 
understanding difficult (ANDON, 2012). In addition to this common difficulty in 
understanding the language of such a complex contract, it is considered that the long-term 
feature and high specificity of PPPs involve high risks to the public sector (ANDON, 2012). 
Another important issue has to be considered: the public interest that must underlie 
democratic responsibilities with regard to community service (GRIMSEY, LEWIS, 
2002). Following this logic, protection of the public interest should be considered in the 
evaluation of partnerships in order to guide practices that clarify a list of issues such as: 
partnership agreements preserve the right of citizens to be well informed about government 
and private sector partner obligations, and can these be supervised? Could those affected 
citizens contribute constructively to the partnership planning? Are adequate governance 
arrangements in place to ensure that disadvantaged groups can effectively use 
services? (GRIMSEY; LEWIS, 2002). 
Acknowledging this gap in the literature arises the research problem that this 
theoretical study seeks to clarify: what are the limitations and perspectives faced by the public 
sector accounting to improve the accountability and evaluation aspects of PPPs? The main 
objective that this study proposes is to identify and discuss theoretically the advances, 
limitations and perspectives pointed by international research to improve the 
accountability and evaluation aspects of PPPs. It is believed that a theoretical approach can 
promote the accumulation of knowledge on the subject, clarifying the role of PPPs in the 
provision of public services and infrastructure, discussing the main problems cited in the 
literature and contributing to the adaptation of public sector accounting to the new challenges 
of reporting. 
This theoretical essay was elaborated from a narrative review and the establishment of 
propositions about the advances, limitations and perspectives that the public sector 
accounting will have in order to improve the quality of the information provided in the 
reporting and to follow the new trends of the State. This review model is indicated when 
researchers seek to synthesize current knowledge on a given subject, from a general 
perspective. The study delimitation considered seminal articles and books in the area, 
including the most recent publications in international journals. 
The originality of this paper resides in two main points: 1) it presents a more recent 
discussion of international literature on the challenges that emerge in the accounting and 
evaluation of PPPs; and 2) it seeks to stimulate the debate on PPPs in Brazil, which despite 
not yet presenting academic data on the subject, a journalistic study showed that of the 53 
federative entities (states and municipalities) that have active contracts, 42 do not record 
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payments in their balance sheets or are breaking tax rules. Only five of them meet the 
requirements set by the Treasury and the others partially meet them (HIRATA, 2018). 
The theoretical approach of this paper surrounds Public Choice Theory to justify 
movements such as New Public Management and New Public Governance on which the 
emergence of PPP is based. This theory attributes a less altruistic treatment to the functions of 
the state and defends the current conjuncture for the creation of hybrid and cooperative 
structures between different actors that thereafter operate with the state in increasingly 
globalized institutional relations. 
This paper is structured in four sections besides this introduction: the first will address 
state redesign from the perspective of public sector reform movements, which envisages the 
possibility for other non-governmental actors to participate in providing infrastructure and 
providing public services. The second section addresses the emergence of PPPs, their 
concepts and key challenges through the possibility of carrying out social and economic 
activities that were previously considered to be strictly state functions. The third section 
establishes, from the perspective of accountability, the challenges and perspectives that public 
sector accounting faces to accompany the need for information between public and private 
partners (and society’s needs). The fourth section discusses the changes and challenges of 
PPP accounting in the light of public choice theory, summarizing the main questions raised in 
the previous section. 
  
1 REFORM ENVIRONMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: MULTIPLE ACTORS 
INTERACTING WITH THE STATE              
  
As a result of the scarcity of resources and the economic crisis facing European states, 
many of the administrative reforms that took place between the 1980s and 1990s were 
centered on the pursuit of economy and efficiency in the public sector (HOOD, 1991). The 
background behind these improvement proposals was to restore levels of government 
confidence lost in the decline of the welfare state. Motivated by this need for changes in the 
state, a movement called New Public Management (NPM) emerged, which suggests a 
different conception of public responsibility, reducing or removing differences between the 
public and private sector and shifting the focus of the process of accountability and directing 
the state towards efficient and effective results (HOOD, 1991). 
The NPM movement has been criticized in many ways, specially for its overly 
intraorganizational focus on an increasingly plural world, and for its adherence to the 
application of outdated private sector techniques for public policy implementation and public 
service delivery (OSBORNE, 2009). This market oriented and efficient results approach was 
also criticized for being less representative of the public interest from a democratic point of 
view. 
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The criticism of the excessive focus on efficient results only by the economic point of 
view was responsible for the emergence of the concept of a more pluralistic state, where there 
is a focus in the interorganizational relations and public governance, emphasizing the 
effectiveness of the services and more efficient results also from the point of view of the 
citizen (OSBORNE, 2009). The rise of pluralism in the public sector replaces the notion of 
the state as the sole provider of public goods and services and gives rise to a movement 
toward interdependence among actors. 
In this global context, the New Public Governance (NPG) is being presented as a 
conceptual tool with the potential to help the understanding of the complexity of the 
challenges of a globalized and pluralistic State of the XXI century (POLLIT; BOUCKAERT, 
2011). One of the most noticeable changes in this movement is made when the state no longer 
occupies a clear position of authority, viewed as a top-down, hierarchical process. In the 
metaphorical conception of NPG, the state becomes just one player among many others in the 
political arena (OSBORNE, 2009). Thus, the political arena has become noticeably more 
crowded and contested, there are more actors involved, the boundaries between the public and 
the private are less precise, and the government's command over the political process is 
constantly changing (OSBORNE, 2009). 
The hybridization between organizations proposed by NPG refers to 
interorganizational forms that merge functions, structures, resources and knowledge and 
management systems that operate in the gray area between the public and private sectors and 
have to combine objectives, values, obligations, identities, orientations and potentially 
conflicting cultural aspects if viewed from the perspective of different institutional logics 
(public, private and third sector) (HODGE; GREVE; BOARDMAN, 2017). From this 
institutional rearrangement, problems can arise regarding risk control and transfer systems, as 
well as interference with the role of mutual trust between private and public sector 
organizations. 
NPG's main assumptions fit the PPP agenda like a glove: the adoption of private 
sector’s technical and market 
competition; better elaborated contracts; better performance measurement systems; 
better formalized objectives; detailed output specifications; and focus on results (HODGE; 
GREVE; BIYGAUTANE, 2018). More broadly, the emergence of PPPs arose from a 
powerful ethos of prioritizing the efficient use of capital, based on the reliability of 
democratic processes to safeguard the public interest (HODGE; GREVE; BIYGAUTANE, 
2018). Accordingly, to achieve this goal and not undermine the democratic values of the state, 
an efficient accountability tool is needed, which allows for the oversight of partnership 
objectives throughout the contract (OPARA; ROUSE, 2018). 
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2 THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC -PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: CONCEPTS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS               
  
Although their advantages are prescribed in the literature, PPPs do not yet have a clear 
definition. Hodge and Greve (2007) state that PPPs are currently seen as the main alternative 
for public service procurement and privatization and are therefore considered a qualitative 
leap in the effort to join forces between the public and private sectors. The OECD (2014, p. 
36) has defined PPPs: 
 
As an agreement between the government and one or more private partners (which 
may include operators and financiers), whereby private partners deliver the service 
in such a way that the service delivery objectives are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment 
depends on sufficient risk transfer to the private partner. (OECD, 2014 p. 36) 
  
Many authors have emphasized mutuality and sharing as key conceptual features of 
PPPs (MORAVIEV; KAKABADSE, 2016). These characteristics become important because 
they are a commitment that goes beyond the contract, they differentiate PPP from outsourcing 
or other traditional forms of public-private contracting. Collaboration and partnership across 
industries is the result of an effort to increase the efficiency and flexibility of organizations by 
providing a solution to one or more of the following issues: resource scarcity, risk distribution 
among partners, and operational inefficiency, therefore, each partner fills a gap in skills, 
resources and / or competencies in which the other partner shows difficulties managing alone 
(VILLANI;, GRECO; PHILLIPS, 2017). 
The main institutional aspects raised in the PPP literature can be systematized into 
three categories: Financial (which includes project financing, risk sharing and revenue 
sharing), Legal (which involves contractual aspects, formalization of purpose specific entities, 
applicable laws and regulations) and organizational (with respect to division of tasks and 
responsibilities, formal decision-making requirements and project organization) (OSBORNE, 
2009). In all these respects, it is observed that the long-term contract is what allows both 
partners to tend to benefit from cooperation and to produce a return on their initial investment 
and, in fact, to meet their interests. 
It should also be stressed that governments must harness the strength of the private 
partner to achieve efficiency gains and choose the jurisdiction that best suits its purpose, 
adopting various contractual arrangements, different shares of risks, different mixtures of 
financing schemes, transparency and assumptions about the best way to deal with governance 
risks or outcomes (HODGE; GREVE; BOARDMAN, 2017). Another predominant feature is 
the fact that PPP deployment and execution processes are extremely complex as a result of the 
long-term, multi-stage legal nature (in terms of design, construction, operation and 
maintenance) (WANG et al., 2017). 
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All the features and benefits of PPPs presented in this section are mixed when trying 
to understand their true motivation. According to Hodge, Greve and Biygautane (2018), it 
should be noted that PPPs can present themselves as both a political tool and a technical 
tool. Thus, while there is a possibility of interpreting them as part of an economic project that 
seeks efficiency in the allocation of public resources, it takes much responsability of the 
public sector to avoid democratic losses and risks (HODGE, GREVE, BIYGAUTANE, 
2018). 
  
3 ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
  
The term accountability and its meaning bring with it a complex, abstract and 
multifaceted question that can be approached in different ways (FOMBAD, 
2014). Historically, public sector accountability is related to control and reporting, whether 
exercised formally, through rules and laws, or indirectly by the society that oversees its 
elected representatives to act on its behalf (FORRER et al., 2010). 
In the context of accountability and its implications, PPPs raise increasingly important 
questions of democratic governance due to the altered nature of the state when engaging in 
cooperative activities with private actors, and there may be a democratic deficit due to lack of 
accountability (BOATENG; STANDFFORD; STAPLETON, 2017). For this reason, the issue 
of accountability becomes more relevant, because since the investments are made in the long 
term and directly affect the rights and public interests, it is necessary to explain and show how 
public services through PPPs meet the substantive values of democracy (FOMBAD, 2014). 
In an attempt to minimize this damage to developing countries, the OECD (2014) has 
set some key points to study and improve in relation to corruption and lack of transparency in 
PPP hiring and enforcement. These points include factors related to: information asymmetry 
between the contracting public authority and the private company that does not make 
sufficient data available to the government and citizens or use unconventional means to 
influence the bidding and contracting process; the possible conflict of interest and culture 
between civil servants acting in the service agency and employees of the private 
company; and, finally, the possibility of contracted companies financing politicians, who can 
use their influence to manipulate the bidding and give results favorable to their own interests 
(OECD, 2014). 
Regarding accountability and the most relevant information to be disclosed and 
analyzed in relation to PPPs, three major characteristics can be considered: first, a 
thorough Value for Money (VfM) is needed to ensure effective processes for calculating 
adequately costs incurred in projects and implementation, as well as the risk shared between 
sectors; later on, emphasis needs to be placed on political accountability over PPP decision-
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making and enforcement; and finally, proper accounting treatment of PPPs is required 
(VIANA et al., 2017). 
The fact that PPPs combine different institutional logics (market, civil society and 
government) requires greater efforts to generate solutions to solve the problem of who is 
responsible to whom, and there is no model properly ready to be applied in its design, 
considering the complexity of the relationships in which citizens became customers and the 
government now behaves as a buyer of utilities (VILLANI; GRECO; PHILLIPS, 2017). The 
institutional complexity they have to deal with can often lead to unintended consequences, 
which can impede the achievement of specific goals and value creation if not properly 
managed (VILLANI; GRECO; PHILLIPS, 2017). 
Hybrid organizations operate partly in the market and partly in the public sector. In the 
marketplace, accountability is based on mechanisms that focus primarily on financial 
performance rather than on the creation of public and democratic values, which are the focus 
of public sector services. In this sense, there is also a challenge in analyzing and studying 
whether a system based on sufficient market and efficiency mechanisms are being sufficient 
to ensure accountability in hybrid bodies that are also subject to public sector values 
(GROSSI; THOMASSON, 2015). 
Contract management is one of the most significant transaction costs for establishing 
governance and accountability in PPPs and is considered one of the most important factors in 
ensuring that the public interest is protected when goods and services are delivered by non-
actors (BOYER; NEWCOMER, 2015). First, contract design requires estimates of how the 
private sector should be paid, and these estimates are based on forecasts of consumer demand 
(such as willingness to pay tolls), long-term operating costs and/or potential related service 
interruptions related to natural resources and possible contingencies. Another challenge is to 
establish the right means of performance appraisal based on key performance indicators, 
errors in this appraisal may lead to overestimation of risks or the actual involvement of the 
private sector in public service delivery or infrastructure construction (BOYER; 
NEWCOMER, 2015). 
Reinforcing the criticism about lack of transparency and accountability, it can be 
argued that the available information about PPP is limited, inaccurate and insufficient 
(REYNAERS; GRIMMELIKHUIJSE, 2015). As a result of this deficiency, there is a lack of 
meaningful and understandable data. Transparency can be observed on two fronts: the 
external one translates the extent to which organizations are visible to society at large, and the 
internal one refers to how the private partner provides clarity on the processes and activities 
performed, informing their performance, risk and expectations to the public (REYNAERS; 
GRIMMELIKHUIJSE, 2015). 
PPPs and their relationships thus establish a typical situation of information 
asymmetry, where transparency is key to ensuring that key players (public agencies and 
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society) oversee agents (private companies) to ensure that the public interest is achieved, and 
the purpose of PPP is met. Aligning public-private interests is one of the most difficult tasks 
in formulating PPP contracts, as they may differ. To remedy this difficulty, it is increasingly 
necessary that studies on the accounting and financial data provided by current PPPs be 
analyzed to determine the degree of transparency offered, seeking possible explanations of the 
lack of accountability and transparency. 
Analyzing the failures of transparency and accountability pointed out in the literature, 
it is clear that more and better regulation is needed. Control mechanisms must be in place to 
prevent inappropriate disclosure under the guise of commercial confidentiality. Accounting 
information should flow between partner organizations and society at large to ensure effective 
oversight of PPPs (CAPERCHIONE; DEMIRAG; GROSSI, 2017; HODGE; GREVE; 
BOARDMAN, 2017). 
 
4.1 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN PPP 
CONTRACTS IN BRAZIL 
  
After discussing the importance of accountability and transparency in PPP contracts, 
discussing the accounting treatment of PPPs is a relevant process to avoid the lack 
of transparency and accountability related to assets and liabilities that may not be included in 
government balance sheets (VIANA et al., 2017). The discussion is also important 
to avoid inadequate disclosure of the long-term fiscal risks involved and the contingent 
liabilities that may be anticipated; and finally, to avoid prejudice to the decision-making 
process, which leads to inefficient allocation of public resources, given the incentives related 
to the achievement of fiscal targets rather than the PPP’s VfM assessment (VIANA et al., 
2017). 
The public sector reforms cited in this essay lead to the conclusion that there are 
several challenges and opportunities for governments to use different accounting techniques 
and structures to reduce barriers and objections to such reforms. Producing a single financial 
report that covers all government activities, including PPPs, is a major accounting challenge 
(CAPERCHIONE; DEMIRAG; GROSSI, 2017). 
Despite the high degree of uncertainty about the best accounting treatment for 
PPPs, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) issued in 2011 
the International Public Sector Accounting Standards 32, Service concession arrangements: 
Grantor (IPSAS 32, 2011). This standard has as its main focus of discussion the recognition 
of assets and liabilities arising from the public concession, which could consider two 
predominant criteria: an approach of risks and rewards or control over the object of the 
concession (HEALD; GEORGIOU, 2011; MOSCARIELLO; CINQUE, 2016). In the risk and 
reward approach, asset ownership rests with the party that bears the most risks and reaps the 
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benefits, and it is up to the (grantor) government to record the associated assets and liabilities 
whenever it bears the most risks. In the second approach (adopted by IPSAS 32), ownership 
of the asset belongs to the party that controls or regulates the services or structure that the 
partner will have to bear (MOSCARIELLO; CINQUE, 2016). 
The purpose of IPSAS 32 was to improve the assumptions previously set forth in 
the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC 12) standard by 
minimizing the possibility of an asset being accounted for by both parties involved in a PPP 
contract or by neither (HEALD; GEORGIOU, 2011). It is expected that the IPSAS 32 and its 
proposal to prevent government units from doing PPP agreements that exceed the debt 
ceilings. In Brazil, the Manual de Contabilidade Aplicado ao Setor Público - MCASP (2019, 
p. 276) (which is a manual for public sector accounting that is governamental issued) provides 
for the updated standardization of accounting procedures for Public Service Concessions 
prepared in accordance with the Norma Brasileira de Contabilidade (NBC TSP) 05 – 
Acordos de Concessões de Serviços Públicos: Concedente (Brazilian Accounting Standard 
No. 5 - Agreements for Public Service Concessions: Grantor), from the Conselho Federal de 
Contabilidade (Federal Accounting Council), also complying with IPSAS 32 and applicable 
Brazilian law. 
According to the Manual on Government Deficit and Debt (2016, p. 335), PPPs can 
create an illusion of accessibility (mainly due to the fact that public sector payments are 
diluted over time), and this illusion is reinforced when those responsible for public 
accounting do not disclose these liabilities in their public statements and balance sheets. Tax 
liabilities arising from PPPs can have a detrimental effect on the fiscal sustainability of the 
public agency and should be properly managed (including contingent liabilities, equity and 
revenue limits and full disclosure of amounts invested in PPP) (MGDD, 2016). 
In the Brazilian context, the advent of PPPs only came to light with the publication of 
Law No. 11,079 of 12/30/2004 (amended by Law No. 13,529, of December 4, 2017). This 
Law establishes the basic conditions for the development and implementation of joint 
ventures between the public and private sectors, through public-private partnerships, being 
considered a kind of regulatory framework for this type of contracting. The recent changes 
that took place at the end of 2017 allows PPPs to have contracts of over R$ 10 million and 
that lasts more than 5 years. Contracts that have as their object only the supply of labor, the 
supply and installation of equipment or the execution of public buildings are prohibited. 
According to the MCASP (2019, p. 281), the public sector must 
[…] [r]ecognize a concession asset when, in addition to the requirements for 
recognition of the asset - the likelihood that future economic benefits or potential 
service benefits from it will flow to the entity and the possibility that its cost or 
value will be determined on a reliable basis - all of the following requirements are 
present: a. The grantor controls or regulates the service object of the grant. b. The 
grantor has control or any significant residual interest in the asset at the end of the 
concession agreement term or the asset is used throughout its useful 
life (MCASP, 2019 p. 281). 
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The MCASP (2019) is brief and objective in addressing PPP accounting, not 
mentioning how to proceed in relation to studies prior to contracting partnerships, nor the 
form of performance evaluation. Regarding the transparency and budgetary adequacy of 
PPPs, the Manual de Demonstrativos Fiscais (Manual of Fiscal Statements) (MDF, 2019) 
determines for all entities of the Brazilian federation to publish, every two months as part of 
the Relatório Resumido de Execução Orçamentária (Summary Budget Execution Report), a 
statement that reports the impacts of PPP contracting in the entity's accounts, specifically on 
the total of: Assets constituted; Liabilities, detailed in: Obligations arising from assets 
constituted by the Special Purpose Company, Provisions for PPP and Other 
Liabilities; Potential Acts Liabilities represented by Contractual Obligations of future 
consideration and Guarantees granted (MDF, 2019). 
Although Brazilian law decides on risks, guarantees and other factors, a review of 
more specific and appropriate factors to Brazilian reality may still be necessary, as it appears 
that PPPs suffer high rates of delay and cancellation in the preceding stages of the signing of 
the contract due to various regulatory constraints or implementation failures (THAMER; 
LAZZARINI, 2015). As a result of this limitation, there are the few PPPs that are in the post-
contractual phase in Brazil, which reduces the number of observations available for a study 
that analyzes partnerships during their construction or operational period (THAMER; 
LAZZARINI, 2015). 
Another aspect of PPP contracts in Brazil is observed by Marques (2017), who 
analyzed, among other cases, the MG-050 highway contract, concluded by the state of Minas 
Gerais, Brazil, in 2007 and effective until the year 2032. Among the particularities of the 
contract, the author mentions that the partnership has had public complaints over the past few 
years due to increased tolls and delayed investment, which has been revised several times 
(although no significant sanctions have been applied). In this case, proper regulation should 
ensure that negotiations between the grantor and the concessionaire take place fairly, 
protecting stakeholders, and in particular the  users. The rules for restoring financial 
equilibrium in Brazil do not offer direct compensation and, therefore, it is very likely that any 
change in investment will result in increased tolls or other fees (MARQUES, 2017). 
By investigating the factors that influence PPP initiatives in Brazil, Thamer and 
Lazzarini (2015) analyzed 177 PPP projects developed in Brazilian states, highlighting the 
importance of creating and stimulating model-specialized agencies to interface with firms and 
define regulatory models to encourage private sector involvement from the outset of these 
projects. The results also indicated that PPPs advance faster in places with moderate level of 
corruption. 
Although the current landscape of PPPs in Brazil has not been studied extensively in 
academic research, data show that in 2017, municipalities, state governments and the Union 
set a record for launched projects (with 281 elaborated projects) but only three were 
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successful and had its contracts signed (MAXIMO, 2017). Assuming that Brazil should 
follow the global trend in infrastructure development through public-private partnerships, it is 
imperative to carry out national and international development plans to address the issues 
of accountability, design and contracting monitoring. 
  
4 LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF PPPS: THE 
ROLE OF ACCOUNTING TO ENSURE THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
  
The theoretical tendency to use more market intervention and less state intervention 
can be explained by the Public Choice Theory (PCT) initially developed by Buchanan (1949) 
and defined as a view of political decisions without romanticism. For the author, democratic 
notions give rise to misconceptions that presume that participants in the political sphere aspire 
to promote the common good. Inspired to pursue the public interest, civil servants are 
portrayed as benevolent civil servants who faithfully perform what is called will of the people. 
In the realistic view of this theory, the economic model of rational behavior 
predominates in which people are guided mainly by their own interests and, for this reason, 
rejects the construction of organic decision-making units, such as people, community or 
society, considering that only individuals make choices (BUCHANAN, 1999). 
Research agendas indicate that the use of PPPs has been motivated as a means of 
increasing the effectiveness of public governance and its outcomes (CAPERCHIONE; 
DEMIRAG; GROSSI, 2017). However, from the perspective of the Public Choice Theory, 
partnerships can also be viewed as a financial venture or loan, which can be motivated purely 
for the purpose of maximizing political appeal to voters as a faster way to resolve conflicts 
(BRINKERHOFF; BRINKERHOFF, 2011). 
Based on the foundations of PCT, one can understand the importance of the PPPs in 
terms of the particular interests of various agents, but not in the public interest as a 
whole. From the standpoint of elected politicians, for example, there is a tendency to expect to 
maximize their short-term reelection opportunities. From the standpoint of bureaucrats, there 
is a mixed utility of the public interest and their personal interest - the relevance of public 
interest in this utility function depends on the incentives they will receive to defend it 
(MONTEIRO, 2010). Still from the individual perspective of the agents, analyzing the parties 
involved in the PPPs, while politicians tend to disregard the long term and maximize their 
choices while in power, the private sector tends to be profit maximizers, exploiting the market 
opportunities (in which them may or may not have ethical concerns) (MONTEIRO, 2010). 
Politicians know that there are some rules (legislation, budget and social control) that 
can restrict their ability to optimize the work done, as they face budget constraints 
(MONTEIRO, 2010). To circumvent this restriction and increase the likelihood of winning 
the next election, most public projects that could benefit users/citizens would have to be 
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approved. This necessity causes elected politicians to tend to circumvent debt restrictions and 
ignore public spending limits. 
Such a situation creates a problem of public choice, where the option to provide a 
service or build public infrastructure through PPP may result in lack of accountability in the 
short term. It is also noted that this problem is aggravated when considering the fact that PPPs 
do not generate public spending in the early years (because payments generally start only after 
infrastructure is completed) creating the false impression that the decision to opt for a 
partnership instead of a traditional hiring can be more advantageous (MONTEIRO, 2010). 
In particular, the implications of PPPs accounting treatment (which involves resource 
management, performance appraisal and control) should be considered at all project phases to 
ensure better decisions and merit of partnerships throughout the contract (ANDON, 2012; 
OPARA; ROUSE, 2018). It is emphasized the need for research that reinforces the role of 
accounting not only as a facilitator of decision making in the hybrid structures of PPPs, but 
also as an instrument of accountability and social control. Table 1 summarizes some 
accounting questions and topics that should be considered to prevent private interest from 
overriding the public interest in contracting a PPP. 
Table 1 - Reflections on the role of accounting to alleviate public choice problems in PPPs 
Accounting Topics Related to PPPs Reflections in the light of Public Choice Theory 
Recognition and disclosure of assets and liabilities 
(ANDON, 2012; HEALD; GEORGIOU, 2011) 
Accounting standards should ensure an effective way 
to measure and disclose assets and liabilities arising 
from PPP contracts. In Brazil, are the requirements of 
the Manual de Contabilidade e Manual de 
Demonstrativos Fiscais being met in a timely and 
clear manner (in accordance with the fundamental 
characteristics of accounting information)? Are they 
sufficient to prevent contracted PPPs from exceeding 
established budget limits? 
Accountability and transparency 
(REYNAERS; GRIMMELIKHUIJSE, 2015; 
BOATENG; STAFFORD; STAPLETON, 2017) 
The accounting information contained in the 
statements and reports must be available and easily 
accessible. In addition to the availability of this 
information, comprehensibility may be affected by 
some factors due to the amount of technical and 
specialized requirements that the contract may bring. 
According to the assumptions of Agency Theory, the 
amount of layers between society and government 
can lead to a higher level of information asymmetry, 
greater conflicts and agency costs. 
Evaluation of the merits of PPPs in the contracting 
phase (VILLANI, GRECO, PHILLIPS, 2017). 
From a managerial point of view, where accounting 
information supports decision-making, the correct 
risk and benefit measures that PPPs may cause 
throughout the long-term contract must be 
observed. Initial studies on the feasibility and merit 
of PPPs should take into account the budgetary and 
fiscal impacts that potential obligations will entail. In 
addition, stakeholder participation should be 
considered in partnership planning and appropriate 
governance arrangements that make it work while 
preserving democratic values. 
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Performance evaluation and quality of service 
monitoring (BOYER, NEWCOMER, 2015) 
Post-hiring evaluations of the private partner should 
consider payments based on pre-established contract 
performance. Quality monitoring mechanisms are 
needed to prevent private partners from using 
informational asymmetry to charge readjustments to 
the public partner, such monitoring can be ensured 
through audit reports, the appointment of a technical 
team responsible for contract enforcement, and 
through of social control. 
 
It is then realized that the involvement of accounting in PPP control and valuation 
needs to occur from the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the asset delivery 
or service delivery model (either the traditional hiring model or PPPs). Accounting should be 
dedicated to understanding the social construction of the values set by each of the models, and 
how they fit into the socio-political context, assessing at all stages of implementation (through 
the audit process) the nature and extent risk transfer and, eventually, the VfM assessment 
(OPARA; ROUSE, 2018). 
The Manual on Government Deficit and Debt (MGDD, 2016) applied to European 
Union countries also acknowledges their concern about the perceived complexity of 
accounting rules regarding PPP accounting and the difficulties in understanding how they 
apply to specific projects (considering that a PPP can range from designing and building 
infrastructure such as a school or hospital to providing public services, it is difficult to 
generalize results and assessments). According to this manual, the decision of the public 
sector to obtain structures and services through PPPs is often influenced by expectations 
regarding their accounting treatment (considering the impact on government debt and deficit 
values). Given these considerations, uncertainties on how to evaluate a PPP on an accounting 
basis can therefore create difficulties and delays in the various phases of project planning, 
preparation and implementation (MGDD, 2016). 
These uncertainties about how to proceed with accounting may also be reflected by the 
subjectivity of the standard itself, which requires professional judgment to classify control, 
risks, and the fair value of the constructed enterprises. It is necessary to detail the modality of 
risk (which involves subjectivity in its measurement, classification and allocation among 
partners); the control exercised over the assets involved in the partnership (having or not 
controlling the assets is the determining factor for recording the asset in the public balance 
sheets) (MGDD, 2016). 
When the assumption of benevolent government is relaxed, according to the 
assumptions made by TEP, the decisions of public actors can be affected by opportunistic 
behavior and/or external pressures (BUSO; MARTY; TRAN, 2017). This influence can lead 
governments to a choice that is not necessarily cost-effective, damaging decision-making and 
inefficient allocation of public resources. 
To try to avoid this opportunistic behavior, more targeted and detailed regulation of 
PPPs is needed to improve some of their functions, such as: better conflict management 
     REAd | Porto Alegre – Vol. 26 – N.º 1 – Janeiro / Abril 2020 – 114-136.  
129 
between parties; protection and solution to possible customer and user complaints; protection 
of the public interest in the inevitable renegotiations throughout the contract; allow better, 





This theoretical essay had as its main objective to identify and discuss the advances, 
limitations and perspectives pointed by international researches to improve the accountability 
and evaluation aspects of PPPs. To this end, a discussion was elaborated in the light of Public 
Choice Theory, inserting the trend within the global movement known as New Public 
Governance. A historical approach was taken to emphasize the emergence of PPPs and then to 
understand their main characteristics and challenges, emphasizing aspects 
of accountability and accounting within the public/private dichotomy. The motivation for the 
issue, its questions and challenges is timely as the number of PPP contracts has entered a 
growing wave in many countries. 
In a world context of economic crises, the functions of the state were retracted because 
of the scarcity of resources, but once stability is restored, they are once again expanded, under 
a new form of governance in which the state becomes one amongst many actors acting in 
favor of the citizen and social welfare. 
In this sense, a PPP cannot be defined simply as a business transaction, but as a long-
term contractual relationship, where both partners learn over time, where the informational 
asymmetry between the parties needs to be lowered and implemented mechanisms for 
governance and monitoring to ensure the smooth running of contracts. 
Thus, the theoretical contribution of this article uses the justifications of the Public 
Choice Theory to emphasize the need for accountability and the defense of the public interest 
in relations between the State and private partners, considering that such relations can alter the 
notions of balance and power in a partnership. Also considering the postmodern contributions 
of the NPM and NPG movements, it is possible to see an institutional view of the character of 
the partnerships, in which the expected benefits can face “problems of public choices”. 
Another theoretical reflection that is expected to contribute is the inclusion of partnerships in 
the role of the regulatory State (no longer a provider), which is responsible for ensuring that 
partnerships are a choice based on VfM studies, with an efficient allocation of resources. 
Given that TEP's assumptions for PPPs can be seen as a way to circumvent the public 
budget and achieve short-term political objectives, a rigorous evaluation and control process 
must be established in Brazil to ensure the cost-benefit behind the decision, whether or not to 
opt for a partnership, and to ensure the quality of the contracted service, in accordance with 
the democratic values of the public sector, especially in the defense of the public interest. 
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Regarding the role of accounting in the evaluation and control of partnerships, it is 
clear that there is a need to examine the reports, statements and bids that led to the hiring of 
PPPs and their various peculiarities and types in order to strike a balance between private and 
public interests and benefits. Bodies such as the IASB have focused on regulating liabilities 
and assets as a result of partnership agreements, but there is still a lot of subjectivity about 
how these records that are being made with respect to the long-term characteristic of contracts 
and the allocation of risks in a fair and clear fashion. In Brazil, the literature on PPPs is still 
incipient, so that no research has been conducted to examine the clarity and objectivity of the 
accounts and audits of current PPP contracts, which can be pointed as a research agenda. 
Some of the authors who pointed out a research agenda for the topic (HODGE; 
GREVE; BOARDMAN, 2017; HODGE; GREVE, 2017; MORAVIEV; KAKABADSE, 
2016) agree that governments adopt several different contractual arrangements, establishing 
different risk-sharing, different financing arrangements and transparency regimes on how best 
to deal with contract risks or how to achieve better governance outcomes. So, for each 
different goal that you want to achieve with a PPP, different characteristics can be observed 
depending on the reality of each government. 
In this sense, future research could be conducted using innovative methods as 
suggested by Caperchione, Demirag and Grossi (2017). Case studies and interviews can be 
used to further investigate which changes in accounting statements and accountability would 
best be leveraged in hybrid organizations. 
As a final perspective, in accountability processes, it is necessary to ensure that the 
dual objectives of hybrid organizations are protected. Given the changes proposed by 
movements such as NPM and NPG, it should be noted that what constitutes an advantage 
from the point of view of the processes of generating public services must be properly 
concatenated with the perspective of accountability and public responsibility, so that that 
better results in public service delivery and infrastructure construction are in balance with 
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